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NEWSMAN'S IMMUNITY STATUTE-A COmPARISON OF LEGISAATIVE INTENT TO STATUTORY Foam

In May, 1970, the Indiana Supreme Court' affirmed a lower
court's decision which included in it a commentary on the scope and
application of an Indiana statute granting newsmen immunity from
being forced to disclose their sources of information before a judicial
body.2 The relevant facts of the case are that Buford Lipps and two
others were charged with the robbery of a cocktail lounge in Marion
County, Indiana, during which two police officers and the bartender
were wounded and a fourth hold-up man was killed. While Lipps
was awaiting trial, the wife of one of the gunmen contacted a newspaper reporter. She told the reporter, Richard Johnson, that her
husband and Lipps wished to speak with him. At their request,
Johnson arranged for an interview to be held in a jury room of
the criminal court. During this interview Lipps confessed to shooting the bartender.
The police were aware of the interview and during the trial the
1. Lipps v. State, -

Ind. App. -,

258 N.E.2d 622 (1970).

2. BuRvs IND. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968 Repl.).
2-1733. Newspapers, television and radio stations-Press Associations-Employees and representatives-Immunity.
Any person connected with a weekly, semi-weekly, triweekly or
daily newspaper ... shall not be compelled to disclose in any
legal proceedings or elsewhere the source of any information
procured or obtained in the course of his employment... whether
published or not published in a newspaper .

employed.

.

. by which he is

Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

prosecution called Johnson to testify as to what had transpired.
Defense counsel objected, claiming among other grounds, that the
Indiana statute granted Johnson immunity from contempt charges
in refusing to disclose his sources of information. The court held
that Lipps did not have standing to object under the statute as it
created a right personal to the newsman which only he could invoke. Lipps was convicted on the basis of the admission. Lipps v.
State, - Ind. App. -, 258 N.E. 2d 622 (1970).

This decision raises complex evidentiary and constitutional problems. There exists an evidentiary right to everyman's testimony.
This right must be sustained to effectuate the administration of justice for all persons. Counterbalancing the evidentiary need is the
first amendment guarantee that Congress shall pass no laws
abridging the freedom of the press. Inherent in freedom of the
press lies the public concern for safeguarding the right to be well
informed during periods of social and political turmoil. To help
insure a well informed public, California has enacted an immunity
statute similar to that involved in Lipps.3 Its scope also limits the
protection of news sources by placing the ability to invoke the immunity exclusively in the hands of newsmen. The purpose of this
discussion will be to evaluate the need to protect the identity of
sources of information from disclosure by extending the immunity
statute to both newsmen and their sources.4 Also to be considered
3. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West 1966).
Newsman's refusal to disclose news source.
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper... cannot be adjudged in contempt
by a court, the Legislature, or any administrative body for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for
publication and published in a newspaper.
Nor can a radio or television reporter . . . be so adjudged in
contempt....
4. It is not pertinent to the discussion to deal with arguments for or
against the adoption of a privilege except where these arguments are
necessary in unearthing legislative intent. For some excellent discussions
of rationales both supporting and opposing the creation of a newsman's
immunity statute see: Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969-1970);
Note, The Right of a Newsman To Refrain from Divulging the Sources
of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950); Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to Withhold Sources of Information from the Court, 45 YALE L.J.
357 (1935).

In investigating California's statute and the possible need for its amendment, other questions arise that will not be dealt with but should be
acknowledged. The most striking is whether the immunity should be

is the equally basic need to protect society from abuse of the immunity by unknown libelers and the infringements placed on the
interests of justice by such an extension of the statute.
CALiFoRNIA LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING
THE NEWSmAN'S IAMMUNI
STATUTE

California originally enacted its first newsman's immunity statute
in 1935. 5 A 1961 amendment expanded the statute to include radio
and television reporters.8
The first statement of legislative intent was made in a California
Senate Joint Resolution in 1961. Its purpose was to urge the United
States Congress to establish a federal statute granting an immunity
to newsmen. In reference to the free exchange of information as
being a bulwark of democracy, the Resolution stated:
. . . [I]t is safe to say that there have been countless misdeeds by
public officials brought to light only because someone with knowledge of wrongdoing passed the information on to such a reporter
of the news, secure in the knowledge that his confidence would be
respected . .. [w]ithout the privilege of keeping secret his sources
of information, such a reporter of the news would soon find that
his sources of information had dried up, thus severely limiting his
effectiveness . .. .7
The Resolution points to the need for making informants feel secure
by insuring that their identities will remain confidential when they
come forward with information in the public interest. This, in turn,
would encourage continued disclosures to the press and ultimately
produce a more informed public.
In 1964 the California Law Revision Commission undertook a
study8 of the three arguments that journalists most often expound
in support of the newsman's immunity. First, the newsmen argued
absolute. To be consonant with its avowed purpose, should there not be
limitations as to cases involving either hiding the identities of suspected
criminals or in cases of "overriding national interest"?
The California statute limits protection to newsmen only if the information is published. Should not the immunity extend to news gathering as
well to be compatible with its purpose? Who qualifies as a newsman and
what is the scope of newspaper? Does this include underground newspapers or newspapers of extremely limited circulation?
5. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1881(6) (West 1955).
6. CA1. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West 1966).
7. S.J. Res. 41, Stats. & Amends. to the Codes, 1961 Reg. Sess., chap.
211, p. 5004.
8. A California Privilege Not Covered By The Uniform Rules-Newsmen's Privilege, 6 CAL. LAW REVIsION CoMM'N., 481-508 (1964)
(herein
after cited as CAL. Comm'N.). The Proposal as submitted was rejected
by the state congress and CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 remained substantially
intact.
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that immunity protection was required for the maintenance of a free
press. Secondly, it was submitted that legal recognition of the
immunity was in the public interest for in the absence of a statutory privilege unprotected sources would disappear, vitally curtailing the flow of news to the public.9 Lastly, the journalists argued
that their code of ethics required them to remain silent in order to
protect their sources of information. 10 The Commission impliedly
rejected the argument based on the journalists' code of ethics.1"
The first amendment argument that statutory protection was
necessary for the maintenance of a free press was also rejected.
The attempted tying-in of newsmen's confidence statutes to a First
Amendment free press argument is wholly without merit because
there is no restraint, actual or implied, imposed by denial of a
statutory privilege.

In the newsmen's favor is the fact that they frequently do perform
Thus, in a particular case it may
a substantial public service ....
the source of a newsman's inprotect
to
interest
be in the public
formation. 12

The Commission recognized only the public policy argument as being valid.
[T]he primary purpose of the proposed rule is to protect the idensources of intity of informants so as to maintain confidential
formation considered of interest to the public.13

Thus, the only valid justification the Commission found in support
9. Id. at 496. Newsmen also point to the public service they perform
by exposing graft and corruption discovered through these confidential
sources. They emphasize that the threat of exposure works as a powerful deterrent to such abuses of public office, and this deterrent would be
missing absent protection.
10. Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to Withhold Sources of Information from the Court, 45 YALE L.J. 357, at 360 n.24 (1935).
Although extension to newsmen of a privilege of confidential11.
ity appears to provide protection for persons in that occupation,
in reality it is the informants who are actually protected....
CAL. Comm'x., supra note 8, at 499.
The question of privilege based on the code of ethics has been dealt with
in several jurisdictions having no statute, and all have soundly rejected
the principle. In re Wayne, 4 Haw. 475 (D. Haw. 1914) (holding that such
a contention is untenable and must yield when in conflict with the interests of justice); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911) (such
a rule is substantially a promise not to obey the law); State v. Buchanan,
250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1969) (granting the privilege is a violation of
equal-protection under the 14th amendment).
12. CAL. Conm'N., supra note 8, at 499.
13. Id. at 506.

of the immunity was that the public interest would be enhanced by
protecting the identity of informers, as the informer would thereby
be encouraged to come forward with information the public might
not otherwise receive. The resulting full disclosure would produce
a more informed public on matters of public interest.14 The proposition remains that the statute has been enacted for the purpose of
insuring the confidential status of an informant's identity.
CASE LAW AND OTHER MATERIAL REFLECTING ON POSSIBLE
JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENDING THE IMMUNITY
STATUTE TO THE INFORIMER AS WELL

California case law is extremely limited in the area of the news-

men's immunity. Only three reported cases deal with the question,
the earliest being People v. Durrant'5 in 1897. The facts in Durrant
are similar to those in Lipps. The defendant tried to halt the testimony of a reporter that included incriminating statements made by
the defendant to the reporter. The ruling, being pre-statute, held
that such a claim "scarcely merits comment."'1
A second 1897 case, Ex Parte Lawrence,17 involved a refusal by
two news reporters to testify before a state senate investigating
committee as to the sources of information that led to a series of articles charging state senators with bribery. Their claim of privilege
based on their promise of confidentiality to the source was refused
by the California Supreme Court.
In re Howard-'s is the only case that deals with the interpretation
14. The Commission's conclusion that first amendment guarantees were
not involved is tenuous. Admittedly, forced disclosure may not be a per
se violation of first amendment rights. However, the accepted argument
that compelling disclosure has a detrimental effect on the public right to
have full information on public affairs, is inextricably bound up in first
amendment rights, as the following investigation into available case law
will prove.
The Commission further claimed that reason dictated against the granting
of any special privilege for newsmen, but presumed a congressional desire
for some protection based on the 1961 Senate Joint Resolution cited herein
note 7. It was therefore, with reluctance that the proposal was submitted.
15. 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897).
16. Id. at 220, 48 P. at 86.
17. 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897). After the court ruled that the information sought was relevant to the committee's investigation, the reporters

were adjudged in contempt, the court saying:

It cannot be successfully contended and had not been seriously
argued, that the witnesses were justified in refusing to give these
names upon the ground that the communications were privileged.
[Cal.] Code Civil Proc. § 1881.
Id. at 300, 48 P. at 125.
18. 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 189 P.2d 537 (1955). The reporter was called
upon to testify at a hearing to determine whether a preliminary in-
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of California's immunity statute. However, the question in Howard
was whether a newsman's act of quoting statements attributed to
the defendant acted as a waiver of the newsman's immunity from
forced disclosure. The court adopted a liberal interpretation of the
statutory wording and held no waiver. The importance of this decision lies in the fact that the court, by interpreting the statute liberally, at least impliedly recognized the importance of protecting
the confidential relationship whenever possible. Indeed, the holding is especially noteworthy in light of authority demanding that
statutes granting privileges in derogation of the common law be
strictly construed. 19

Decisions in sister states interpreting their immunity statutes are
limited in number and relevancy to the issue here. 20 A 1963 Pennsylvania decision, dealing with the interpretation of the scope of the
word "sources" in that state's immunity statute did, however, touch
upon the question of what was the Pennsylvania legislative intent
in enacting the statute. The court held that public policy interests
demanded that the statute be liberally construed so as to provide
the greatest latitude in protecting newsmen's sources. 21 While
claiming that the first amendment does not include the right to refuse disclosure, the court did recognize that news from these sources
would cease if newsmen could not fully and completely protect the
sources of information, and that it was vitally important that this
public shield be preserved. The court continued by saying that
junction should be issued against a striking union. The statements in
question were allegedly made by a union official in direct defiance of a
temporary restraining order that had been obtained.
19. State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
(Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, and
that courts are not to infer legislative intentions that alter the common
law principles further than expressed or absolutely required); Brogan v.
Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J.L. 139, 123 A.2d 473, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (When
consequences to a third party appear serious, the statute ought not to be
applied unless the facts are clearly within the purview of the statute.);
Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269,
197 A.2d 416, 420 (L. Div. 1964) (acknowledges nearly universal recognition that statutory privilege, in derogation of the right to obtain information directly in issue, be strictly construed). See State v. PackardBamberger & Co., Inc., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
20. Cases cited note 19 supra. These cases did deal with the interpretation of New Jersey's immunity statute. However, the opinions did little
to expose the rationale for enacting the statutes and dealt primarily with
the question of what acts constitute a waiver of the immunity.
21. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).

even if the information was of a crime, such information should be
protected because the potential for concealing crimes was negligible
compared to the need for protecting all sources of information. 22
A dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's position that
"sources" included the news material itself rather than just the
identity of informers. The dissenter rebutted the majority's argument but said that the purpose of the statute was to protect the
free flow of news to the public by protecting informers who would
23
not otherwise come forward with the information.
The case of In re Goodfader's Appea 24 presented the question of
whether or not the United States District Court of Hawaii would
adopt a newsman's privilege for the first time. Pursuant to the defendant's urging of adoption on the basis of first amendment
rights, the court spoke of the scope and effect of that amendment
citing Justice Black's opinion in Associated Press v. United States:
That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare
2 5 of the public, that a free press is a con-

dition of a free society.
The court went on to say that the primary purpose of the first
amendment is to preserve the rights of the American people to full
information concerning the doings and misdoings of public officials. 26 The majority was not convinced that the privilege was pro-

tected by the first amendment. It stated, however, that in the absence of a ruling by the United States Supreme Court, forced disclosure might constitute an impairment of freedom of the press, but
that such an impairment was subservient to the public interest of
compelling the testimony of witnesses. 2 7
Closely paralleling the rationale employed in Goodfader, was that
used in deciding Garlandv. Torre.28 There the court acknowledged
that by diminishing the public's source of information, forced dis22. Id. at 185.
23. Id.

24. 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
25. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), as cited in In re Goodfader, id. at 323, 367 P.2d
at 477.
26. In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 322, 367 P.2d 472, 477 (1961).
27. Id. at 329, 367 P.2d at 480. It appears that it was on the basis of
this rationale denying first amendment protection per se, that the California Law Revision Commission concluded that there was no merit to the first
amendment argument.
28. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). A New
York columnist printed allegedly libelous remarks about celebrity Judy
Garland, attributing these statements to a television station executive.
In an action by Miss Garland against the columnist, the defendant was
held in contempt for failure to disclose the identity of the executive.
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closure would entail an abridgement of freedom of the press to some
degree, but that such an infringement could not outweigh the duty
to testify.
If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the
press-is here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it too
must give place under the Constitution to29a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.
Although involved in first amendment issues distinct from our
discussion here, New York Times Company v. Sullivan 30 nevertheless serves as a judicial barometer of the Supreme Court's attitude
toward the protection of first amendment liberties. The Court, in
quoting from their decision upholding an Illinois group libel statute,
stated: ". . . [D]iscussion cannot be denied and the right, as well
as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." 31 A concurring Justice
Black was more emphatic in his interpretation of the extent to
which first amendment protection should be carried when he stated
flatly: "An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the
32
First Amendment."
The dissent in In re Goodfader claimed that the majority, by refusing to find for an immunity, was not supplying the informer
with the assurances he needs and that the pro tanto knowledge of
the public was being diminished.3 3 A refusal to grant to informants
this protection would lead to an incomplete safeguarding of the first
amendment guarantee, for:
No information would be given if the informant did not have faith
in the integrity of the reporter in the manner of withholding his
name. 3 4 The newspaperman would find his channels of news
closed.
Absent a statute, the common law demands that journalists testify as to the identity of their sources of information. But without
29. Id. at 549.
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Rather than dealing with newsmen's privilege,
the issue here was the extent fair comment and criticism, under the first
amendment, acted as a defense to a public official's charge of libel.
31. Beauharnais v. Ill.,
343 U.S. 250, 264 (1951), as cited in New York
Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
32. New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964).
33. 45 Haw. 317, 360, 367 P.2d 472, 495 (1961), the court citing, Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958).
34. Siebert & Ryniker, Press Winning Fight to Guard Sources, EDITOR &
PumisH R, Sept. 1, 1934, at 9, 36-7.

a statute it can be argued that the first amendment requires such
protection to prevent infringement of freedom of the press. The
proposition has been best presented in a letter written by the District Attorney of Richmond County, New York to the chairman of
the New York Law Revision Commission's study dealing with the
newsman's immunity:
[F]reedom from censorship of any kind imposed by an external
source-is a peculiarly American concept ....
If press and radio are to continue to be an important factor in
the growth of democracy, they must be as free to gather as to distribute news ....
If the newspapermen can be compelled to reveal the sources of information from which they obtain facts, then
those sources can be shut off, news becomes subject to censorship ....
It is more important to the United States... that the radio and
press of the United States be free and uncensored . .. than it is
for a public official to make even the most important decision
correctly. 35

In his opening comments at a hearing of legislators, members of
the New York Bar, and journalists discussing the issue, Chairman
Smith of the New York Law Revision Commission summarily
stated:
[I]t is obvious to me that those in favor of privilege place it upon

public interest, freedom of the press, giving the public a chance to
find out what is going on, and that unless information given in
confidence can be kept in confidence, it would be difficult for reporters to get the information, and, therefore, the public would
not
36

get the news. That is what is back [sic] of this argument.
An investigation of California legislative intent and the available
case law has repeatedly unearthed the proposition that the purpose

of the statute is to insure the free flow of news to the public, This
goal is insured by an immunity statute which bolsters the security
of the informer in keeping his identity protected. This, in turn, will
encourage the informer to approach the news media with information which only he holds. Based on the preceding analysis, it would
be more consistent with this goal than the present statute provides
if the informer himself was an additional holder of the immunity.
35. Report and Study relating to Problems Involved in Conferring
upon Newspapermen a Privilege which would Legally Protect Them from
Divulging Sources of Information Given to Them, NEw YoRK LAW R iSiON COMM'N., 109-10 (1949) (hereinafter cited as NEW Yom ComM'IN).
36. Id. at 112. At the same hearing, J.H. MacDonald, Executive Secretary of the Commission added:
If the source of news cannot be kept confidential, much information of value to the public will never see public print. Papers
will have to print merely all the news a prosecutor sees fit to
print.
Id. at 144.
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Speaking for the Committee on State Legislation of the New York
State Bar Association, Mr. H. J. Kennedy opposed proposed legislation 37 granting an immunity to newsmen saying:
[W]e think that the bill, by extending the privilege to the per[..
son informed, in this case the news writer or anyone connected with
the newspaper, is not on a parity at all with the present statutes in
the Civil Practice Act which applies to doctors, lawyers, and priests
....
In this case we turn it all around and we give the privilege
to the man
informed. Certainly it is not justified or in line with
38
precedent.
Admittedly, Lipps remains weak on its facts to support the proposition of placing the immunity in the hands of the informer as well
as the newsman. The fact persists that there will arise instances, as
39
in Lipps, where the newsman will not protect his source's identity.
If it is the informer's security that we wish to assure in order to
encourage him to divulge information to the press, then the only
proper instrument consistent with this purpose is to vest the immunity in the hands of the informer. Hence, the informer will enjoy total protection and would not have to fear a possible breach of
confidence. Statutory amendment is in order, absent good reason
for continuing the deficiency.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTENDING

THE IMMUNITY TO THE INFORMER

The conclusion reached by the California Law Revision Commission is that newsmen alone should hold the privilege of immunity.
First, the Commission points to differences between the reportersource relation and those relations (e.g. husband-wife, attorneyclient) that have been granted privileged status either through the
common law or by statute. Among these differences is the fact that
in other privileged relationships it is the context of the communication that is sought to be protected where both parties are known.
37. After this extensive study and research, a proposal was finally submitted to the New York State Congress for enactment. The bill stood an
excellent chance of becoming law but was defeated due to opposition by a
number of powerful newspapers who lobbied against it because it offered
only limited protection. STEIGLEmAN, THE NEwsPAPERviAN AND T=E LAW,
201 (1950).
38. NEW YoRx CoMn'N., supra note 35, at 137.
39. See In re Wayne, 4 Haw. 475, 478 (D. Haw. 1914). After the court
had reached its decision not to grant the privilege to the defendantreporter, the defendant immediately revealed the name of his informant
to escape the contempt charge imposed on him.

In the newsman's case it is the communication that is public while
the identity of one of the parties is the subject of the immunity.
Furthermore, whereas the common law privileges deal with a confidential communication based on a confidential relationship, here
the relationship is based solely on the communication. It is also
pointed out that while these other occupational privileges involve
professions providing a service for the person making the disclosure,
no such service is performed by the journalist to the informer.
Lastly, the Commission urges, there is a lack of professional responsibility and no occupational safeguards to prevent abuses of the
privilege. Other groups granted a privilege are subject to license
through governmental or professional control or, as in the case of
the clergy, the profession is such that none is deemed necessary.
The Commission does not claim that these differences are decisive to
the issue of granting the immunity to informers or of resting control
of the immunity exclusively in the hands of the reporter. The
Commission asserts that these dissimilarities are, in fact "unimpor40
tant."
The New York Law Revision Commission concludes that any dissimilarity between the newsmen-informer privilege and the common law privileges is inconsequential:
It has been argued that the ancient and recognized privileges differ
from the one proposed to be granted to newsmen in this respect:
that in the case of the physician, lawyer, clergyman or spouse, all
information disclosed must be kept in confidence, whereas in the
newsman's case the information is published
to the world. This
difference is more ostensible than real. 41

This comment apparently echoes the conclusion drawn by the California Law Revision Commission: these differences are of little
importance. However, an argument is posed within the text of
the New York Commission's study that indeed makes the differences significant.
In 1930, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on State Legislation, made this comment in reporting on
several bills designed to establish a privilege:
Moreover, the bills do not prevent the disclosure of the communication, which is the purpose of the present statutes, but merely
prevent the disclosure of the source of the information. Their effect, as a matter of fact, is directly contrary to the effect of the present statutes, in that they encourage the disclosure of the communication instead of preventing it. They open the way to reckless publication and abuse, and while on their face they seem to protect the
editor and reporter, in reality they protect the informant. It seems
40. CAL. CoMM'N., supra note 8, at 499.
41. NEw YoRK Comm'N., supra note 35, at 3-4.
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to us that the informant, who furnishes information to a reporter

for the express purpose of having
it published, should have no
42
immunity as these bills propose.

The substance of this attack is that by protecting the identity of the
source rather than the content of the communication, a shield is
erected that paves the way for abuse. An informer, knowing his
identity is safe from disclosure, may provide information that is not
entirely factual or, motivated by a personal vendetta, could purposely make authoritative statements to the press that are untrue
in an attempt to damage the reputation of a third person. This, of
course, could not happen where the other statutory privileges are
concerned as the abusive information would not be disclosed. This
argument militates against the granting of any privilege to the
newsman. If, however, one still wishes to press for granting of the
immunity, the scope and extent of that privilege must be strictly
limited and restricted so as to preclude any abuse. A spokesman
for the New York County Lawyer's Association addressed himself
to the question of extending the immunity to the informer claiming:
The proposed exemption seems to open the way to reckless pub-

lication and abuse, and while on the face it seems to protect the
editor and reporter, in reality it protects the informant. It is ques-

tionable that the informant who furnishes information to a reporter
for the express purpose of43 having it published should have the
immunity that is proposed.
In analogizing the newsman-source relationship to the government-informer relationship, a difference exists that is the very crux
for not extending the immunity to the informer as well.
The portion of this study on the government-informer privilege
indicates that Rule 3644 also extends the privilege to the informant
42. Id. at 97. Senator Desmond, the author of the bill that sparked the
New York Commission's study, commented on this claim stating:
The argument that physicians, lawyers and clergymen are licensed or ordained and therefore are subject to some control,
seems irrelevant, as does the contention that physicians, lawyers
and clergymen cannot publish information and therefore cannot
do as much harm as a reporter, since the issue is whether such
privilege is needed and in the public interest.
Desmond, The Newsmen's Privilege Bill, 13 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 9 (June
1949).
43. NEw YoRK Com'N., supra note 35, at 141.
44. Rule 36-Identity of Informer, CAL. LAw REvisiox Comm'N., 474
(1964).
RUrLE 36. Identity of Informer.
A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a

and effectively protects against eavesdroppers by making evidence
as to the informant's identity inadmissible. Unlike that rule, the
proposed rule vests the privilege solely in the newsmen. This is
because of the different considerations applicable to this rule in
that the recipient is a private party not publicly charged with responsibility. Moreover, the maintenance of some difference between these two rules in this regard is thought
45 to encourage divulging information to proper public authorities.
While this contention is not without merit, it is doubtful that by
maintaining such a difference in the two rules, disclosure to governmental agencies will appear more frequently than those made
to the news media. It also raises the question of whether encouragement of disclosure to government agents is more essential than
achieving the intent of the statute, namely the bolstering of source
security so as to in effect aid in the dissemination of news to the
public.
The Commission also reasons that by granting the privilege to
the informer as well, the privilege would be emasculated since the
informant's identity would be revealed at the time that he or his
representative raised the objection. This contention seems to have
been raised merely to prevent a situation from arising that could
become cumbersome in a court of law, and which would hinder the
ease and fluidity that is desired by the courts when handling evidentiary objections. The question of possible emasculation is limited to those fact patterns similar to Lipps where the informer or
source is present in the courtroom. Since the grounds for objecting
to the testimony may be stated to the judge outside the hearing of
the jurors, and since appellate courts read court records objectively
and without drawing inferences from objections, emasculation will
not necessarily have to follow. Although it might create some difficult judicial maneuvers to insure the informer will not make prejudicial statements to the court openly, the law of evidence is not
without many such instances demanding tact and delicacy in manipulation.
The Commission continues by saying that, following the form of
other states' immunity statutes, and based upon the similarity to
the government-informer privilege, the aim of the statutes is to protect the identity of the informer who will be encouraged to disclose
his information: "[I]t is probable that this privilege should be
granted in terms to newsmen only."4 6
person who has furnished information purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of the laws of this State or of the United
States ... and evidence thereof is inadmissible ....

45. CAL. Com'N., supra note 8, at 506.

46. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
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THE CURRENT APPROACH CONCF NMG NEWSMEN'S ImmUNTY
While no case authority exists for the proposition of extending the
immunity to the informant, an argument has been made in support
of the extension, stating that the theory behind immunity statutes
indicates that the informer should hold the privilege.47 A study
investigating the amount of news stories that are precipitated by
confidential sources indicates that a significant amount of public
48
information is obtained through these means.
Today, more than at any other time in our history, there exist
voices of dissent within our society that attack the very foundation
of our established order. The need for the people to know the extent and reasons supporting this disenchantment is of the greatest
importance counterbalanced, though, by society's need to eliminate
criminals. The importance of the need to know becomes evident if
we are to decide for ourselves the validity of these claims and the
possible changes that might be enacted if their soundness is proved.
The contemporary mood has initiated at least one decision that
breaks with federal precedent of refusing to recognize a privilege
absent a statute. This decision was precipitated by a federal grand
jury investigation of the Black Panther Party held in San Francisco.
In an unreported opinion, 49 the Federal District Court for Northern
California issued an order on April 3, 1970 limiting a subpoenaed
journalist's testimony to matters other than information received
from the Black Panthers. The court's rationale was that an infringement on the right to gather and disseminate news under the
first amendment should not be exercised without a showing of
"overriding national interest"; such rights being "indispensable to
the survival of a free society."5 0 While the issue involved con47. Carter, Journalist, his informant, and testimonial privileges, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1111, 1125 (1960). Another article raised the point but went
on to say that statutory construction indicated that the immunity was
personal to the newsman. See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain
from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 65
(1950).
48. Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.REV.18, app. (1969-1970).
49. New York Times, April 4, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
50. Id. This month the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a hearing
on appeal from the district court. Judge Merrill of the Ninth Circuit
commented that it is important that lines of communication be maintained
between the Black Panthers and similar groups, and the public, so that

cerned itself with content of information rather than source identification, the policy considerations underlying the decision reflect
the increasing need to protect political and social minorities in their
quest to reach the public and air their views and complaints.
The judiciary has demonstrated the limit it will reach in the protection of political ideologies. Recently, a county judge sentenced
the editor of a Madison, Wisconsin underground newspaper to six
months in jail for refusing to disclose the sources of information
which led to an article about a dormitory fire at Whitewater State
University in Elkhorn, Wisconsin. Commenting on his decision, the
judge recognized a conflict between the freedom of the press and
the needs of the grand jury to proceed in the interest of public
safety: "If something has to give in this particular instance it has
to be the First Amendment privilege."5 1
On August 10, 1970 United States Attorney General John Mitchell
issued public guidelines to the Department of Justice for subpoenaing members of the news media. In this directive, the Attorney
General acknowledged the first amendment implications in compelling newsmen to appear before federal judicial and investigative
bodies by using subpoena:
The Department of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in
some circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights. 52
During the New York Law Revision Commission's hearing on the
newsmen's privilege, the question arose whether a newsman should
be permitted to invoke the immunity at the initial stages of a libel
suit, and then waive it for purposes of mitigating damages. Questions posed by New York Senator Pliny Williamson then expanded
the issue to include the possibility of changing the wording of the
proposed bill from "shall not be compelled" to "shall not be permitted, except with the consent of the informant."5 3 Without giving reasons for his decision, Mr. IL W. Sanford, chairman of the
Legislative Committee of New York State Society of Newspaper
Editors replied:
If you ask whether the law should read that he should not be pertheir philosophies can be known and assessed. San Diego Union, Sept.
10, 1970, § A, at 16, col. 5.
51. Nmvswnzx, Sept. 14, 1970, at 74. Because of the editor's incarceration, he was unable to respond to another subpoena he received requesting his presence at a grand jury investigation into the recent bombings at
the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Editor Knop's newspaper had
apparently published several articles that included interviews with persons allegedly responsible for the bombings.
52. New York Times, August 11, 1970, § 1, at 24, col. 1.
53. NEw YoRx Comm'N., supra note 35, at 121.
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mitted to disclose the confidence except with the consent of persons giving information-well, I can't see any objection to that. 54
CONCLUSION

It appears that the question of placing the immunity in the hands
of the source of information himself rarely emerges when the
newsman's privilege is being discussed. While several valid arguments point to restricting any privilege in this area, the reasoning
appears more academic than practical.
This writer is not convinced that the current statute granting
newsmen exclusive control warrants perpetuation. To completely
insure the public interest in obtaining information from confidential
sources, the immunity statute needs to be legislatively expanded to
provide a privilege for the informer as well. The ideals of a free
press and a free people are paramount to any argument against
such an extension.
IGNAZIO J. RUVOLO

54. Id.

